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The Doing and the Deed: 
Action in Normative Ethics 
 
 
Constantine Sandis 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This essay is motivated by the thought that the things we do are to be distinguished from our acts of 
doing them. I defend a particular way of drawing this distinction before proceeding to demonstrate 
its relevance for normative ethics. Central to my argument is the conviction that certain ongoing 
debates in ethical theory begin to dissolve once we disambiguate the two concepts of action in 
question. If this is right, then the study of action should be accorded a far more prominent place 
within moral philosophy than previously supposed. I end by considering an extension of the above to 
aesthetic evaluation and, mutatis mutandis, that of our lives in general. 
 
 
 
Prologue 
 
 
There exists a contested distinction within the philosophy of action which entails that the correct 
evaluation of what one does or creates may part ways with that of one’s act of doing or creating it.1 
Drawn correctly, this distinction is of utmost importance to questions in ethical theory, and how we  
generally evaluate our actions and lives. Or so I shall be arguing. 
Attempts to relate philosophy of action to ethics have tended to focus on agency, 
responsibility, free will, and other questions in moral psychology, the latter now treated as a 
separate and increasingly empirical branch of ethics. This is not that project. There are additional 
ethical questions which the philosophy of action is in a position to address, not least debates in 
normative and practical ethics about the nature of right action.2  A particular case in point is the 
interminable debate between consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue-theorists on the potential 
relevance of person's motives and intentions to the rightness or wrongness of her acts.  
 The questions of action, intention, and motive I shall focus on are normally identified as 
belonging to moral psychology. To this extent, it is regrettable that the latter has branched off in a 
way that has encouraged philosophers to think that such questions belong to moral psychology and 
not normative ethics. This is one of two unintended and unforeseen consequences of Anscombe's 
revolutionary paper 'Modern Moral Philosophy', published in this journal almost sixty years ago.3 The 
second involves the creation of normative virtue ethics as a separate position within moral theory, 
one to be adopted by all and only those who think that questions of character matter to right action.4 
                                                          
1 There are possible distinctions to be made between acts and actions but they don't affect anything I have to 
say here. For a puzzling attempt to map the act/action distinction onto that between doing and thing done see 
David Wiggins, Ethics: Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2006), 97, n. 8. 
2 For complications that need not detain us here see Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2000) 1, n.2.  
3 G. E. M. Anscombe, 'Modern Moral Philosophy', Philosophy 33, No. 124 Jan (1958), 1–9. Anscombe's own 
failure to distinguish between doing and thing done is a topic for another paper. 
4 See Rosalind Hursthouse, 'Normative Virtue Ethics', in (ed.) R. Crisp, How Should One Live? (Oxford University 
Press, 1996), 19–33. 
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 In what follows I resist both trends by relating conceptual and ontological questions about 
action to normative ethics. We may characterise this method as applied philosophy of action, so long 
as such a thing leaves space for a kind of analytic deconstruction of moral theory. 
 
 
1. Ambiguity in Action  
 
 
Someone interested in action might wish to explore a number of distinct things such as how the 
word 'action' is used, our concept(s) of action, different conceptions of action, and empirical findings 
about actions themselves. In each case there are numerous distinctions to be made and different 
ways of carving things up. I shall focus on just one of these, namely the conceptual distinction 
between what one does and one's doing (of) it.  There are radically different ways of understanding 
this distinction. Indeed, those who appeal to it, myself included, express such a wide range of 
competing conceptions of each of the two things distinguished to the point where it becomes 
unclear whether they really are all making the same distinction. I begin by quoting from three 
influential approaches, in chronological order. 
 John Macmurray writes the following in an Aristotelian Society exchange with A.C. Ewing on 
the nature of actions: 
 
 
The term ‘action’ is involved in the same ambiguity [as] terms like ‘perception’ or ‘conception’. It may refer 
either to what is done or to the doing of it […] either ‘doing’ or ‘deed’. When we talk of an action we are 
normally referring to what is done.5 
 
 
Leaving aside the final claim about ordinary language, the idea here is that the word 'action' is not in 
any way special for being ambiguous in this regard. Macmurray's distinction is presented as a formal 
one that may presumably also be extended to additional psychological phenomena such as those of 
belief, desire, fear, suspicion, thought, etc. In effect, it is a basic logical distinction between a kind of 
process or activity on the one hand, and its product, content, or object on the other (things which 
should themselves resist conflation). We don't do our own doings anymore than we fear our own 
fearings or suspect our own suspectings.6 
Paul Ricœur extends the scope of interest to speech and writing: 
 
 
What in effect does writing fix? Not the event of speaking […] it is speech itself insofar as it is said […] To what 
extent may we say that what is done is inscribed? […] in a metaphorical way, some actions are events that 
imprint their mark on their time.7 
 
 
In the case of writing, the distinction comes closer to that between a process and its resulting 
product. Ricœur is suggesting that we might, by extension, hold the same to be true of the speaking 
and the thing said and, a forteriori, the doing and the thing done.8 He is aware that his suggestion 
contains the difficulty that, when all is said and done, these things do not remain in the world in the 
                                                          
5 John Macmurray, ‘What is Action?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. XVII (1938), 74–6. 
6 See Alan R. White, ‘What We Believe’ in (ed.) N. Rescher, Studies in the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1972), 69–84. 
7 Paul Ricœur, From Text to Action, trns. K. Blamey & J. Evanston (London: Continuum, 2008 [1986]), 142–9. 
8 For the philosophy of what we are doing when we say things, see Jennifer Mather Saul, Lying, Misleading, and 
What is Said: An Exploration in the Philosophy of Language and Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
                                                                                                                                        
3 
 
literal way that things written might; they are not carved in stone, or even paper. And yet, Ricœur 
reminds us, our events of acting – a subset of which are speech-act events – may nonetheless leave 
imprints or traces of a biographical, psychological, historical, cultural, or empirical nature.9 
 This thought of actions as events connects with Jennifer Hornsby's way of framing the 
distinction as one between (i) the spatio-temporally located events of of our doing things and (ii) the 
things we do, the latter admitting to being done by different agents across more than one location or 
occasion, including the possible future as in Lenin's What is to be Done?: 
 
 
The word ‘action’ is ambiguous. Where it has a plural: in ordinary usage what it denotes, nearly always, are the 
things people do; in philosophical usage, what it denotes, very often, are events, each one of them some 
person’s doing something.10 
 
 
Like Macmurray, Hornsby takes our ordinary talk of action to typically denote things done. My own 
view is that in everyday language the term 'thing done' is itself multiply ambiguous, much as we 
might use the expression 'soup' in any of the following assertions: 'the soup is always great at Gino's'; 
tonight's soup is very good'; and 'your soup looks nicer than mine (even though they presumably 
come from the same kitchen batch)'. Such ambiguities account for much conflation in the philosophy 
of action, if not that of Donald Davidson who, misled by the Quinean mirage of desert landscapes, 
provides a systematic argument for why all action statements quantify over events.11 The trouble is 
that there exists conceptual space for a distinction that is only partially mirrored in our ordinary use 
of the terms 'doing' and 'thing done', the latter frequently being used rather liberally, as in 'the 
hardest thing I ever did'.  
All analogies sooner or later come to an end, of course. What I do is neither the product nor 
the content of my doing. Nor is it an object in the way that the things I perceive, such as the records 
on the table, are. Deeds are not entities of any kind, be they type or token. Accordingly, we must  
take my soup comparisons with a pinch of salt: what I do is not the same sort of thing as what I ate or 
hope to eat12, not even in the Proustian sense in which I might lament that the rusty bicycle in the 
garden shed is not as bright or green as the one I remember.13 Moreover, it is at best contentious to 
assume that the 'of' in 'the event of my doing x' is one of identity (as in 'the county of Hertfordshire') 
as opposed to, say, relation (as in 'the University of Hertfordshire').14  
Unsurprisingly, we find competing ontologies of doings and things done in the literature, 
with little consensus on whether the former are particulars, events, processes, instances of relations 
etc. and the latter universals, types, results, products, etc.15 For now, however, I have merely wished 
to highlight a more general agreement on the basic distinction between particular doings and 
                                                          
9 For Ricœur's development of Levinas and Derrida's' theories of the trace see his La Mémoire, l’Histoire, l’Oubli 
(Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2000). 
10 Jennifer Hornsby, Simple Mindedness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 142.  
11 Donald Davidson, ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences' (1967); reprinted in his Essays on Actions & Events, 
2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 105–21. 
12 See Hans-Johann Glock, ‘Truth Without People?’, Philosophy, 72 (1997), 98. I discuss the individuation of 
things done in The Things We Do and Why We Do Them (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 34 & 150. 
13 As the narrator of In Search of Lost Time puts it in the volume's closing passage,'[t]he places we have known 
do not belong only to the world of space on which we map them for our own convenience. They were only a 
thin slice, held between the contiguous impressions that composed our life at the time […] houses, roads, 
avenues are as fugitive, alas, as the years'. Proust, Swann's Way [1913], 513. 
14 See my The Things We Do, 8 & 33. 
15 Just as there are different conceptions of the basic distinction between doings and things done, so there are 
different conceptions of each of the two things distinguished; the latter may differ even when there is 
agreement on the former. 
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repeatable things that you and I might both do.16 We might, for example,  both listen to Leonard 
Cohen's You Want it Darker again and again, with each of our singular, spatio-temporally located, 
acts of doing so differing in their properties: you play the MP3 as background on your ipod during 
your morning jogs and in the afternoons as you drive home from work; I listen to the LP attentively in 
the evenings by the fireplace at home, usually (but not always) by myself in the dark, with a glass of 
burgundy wine at hand.17 
 
 
 
2. Right and Wrong Action 
 
 
 
Despite the relative prevalence of the above distinction in the philosophy of action, it is all but 
completely ignored in normative theories concerned with right action. These are typically in the 
business of offering necessary and sufficient conditions of the form 'an action is right if (and only if) 
it…' where the blanks may be filled by statements such as 'promotes the greatest good', 'maximises 
pleasure', 'stems from a good will', 'is what the virtuous agent would (advise you to) do', 'is 
prescribed by divine command', and so on.18 But moral theorists rarely stop to ask fundamental 
questions about action, sticking to the bare minimum needed to deal with the act/omission 
distinction and the doctrine of double effect.19 The unvoiced assumption is that one can simply plug 
in one's favoured account of action, the dominating consensus having largely been that actions are 
events. I maintain that this assumption lies at the core of what renders debates within normative 
ethics irresolvable. 
 To illustrate, here are some concise claims about right action, chosen randomly from across 
the normative spectrum. The first comes from Jesse Prinz's defence of sentimentalism about moral 
rightness and wrongness: 
  
An action has the property of being morally right (wrong) just in case it causes feelings of approbation 
(disapprobation) in normal observers under certain conditions.20 
 
 
Notice how actions are here understood as the sorts of things that can have moral properties, but 
there is no mention (and you will have to trust me that this is so throughout his book) about whether 
he is here thinking of a doing or a thing done. The sentence gives us some clues: it is the sort of thing 
that may be observed 'cause feelings' and to this extent sound more like a doing than a thing done. 
Either way, the view is meant to be in competition with other accounts of right action which also fail 
to disambiguate.  
                                                          
16 Not everybody conceives of the doing/thing done distinction in even these general terms. For example, H.A. 
Prichard, G.H. von Wright, and David Charles all think of the thing done as the bodily event that action results 
in; see Prichard's 'Duty and Ignorance of Fact' (1932) as reprinted in his Moral Writings, (ed.) J. MacAdam 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004, 85), G.H. von Wright Norm and Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963, 
39) and D. Charles 'Processes, Activities and Actions' in (ed.) R. Stout, Process, Action and Experience (Oxford 
University Press, 2017). 
17 We can of course contract sets of things done to include such details, but not beyond the bounds of 
generality. For complications to do with properties and descriptions see Davidson, 'The Logical Form of Action 
Sentences', 106 & 'Adverbs of Action' (1985), reprinted in his Essays on Actions & Events, 293–304. 
18 Andreas Lind has convinced me that the employment of such biconditionals is often confused with regard to 
whether they are picking out meanings, right-makers, truth-conditions, etc.  
19 Neglected exceptions include E. D'Arcy's Human Acts: An Essay in their Moral Evaluation (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1963) and D.G. Brown's Action (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968). 
20 Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals (Oxford University Press, 2007),20. 
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Writing about moral obligation, H.A. Prichard claims that: 
 
 
An obligation is always an obligation to do some action.21 
 
 
So long as I do the action in question, I have fulfilled my obligation, whatever my motive. This is why 
W.D. Ross, following Prichard, will ultimately claim that moral rightness should be distinguished from 
moral goodness.22 The question remains, however, whether I can be said to be acting wrongly merely 
by virtue of doing the wrong thing. Jonathan Bennett seems to not only think that this is so but that it 
is a basic semantic truth: 
 
 
When we say that what he did was wrong we mean that he acted wrongly.23 
 
 
Yet acting wrongly is at best itself ambiguous between doing the wrong thing and doing some thing 
(right or wrong) for the wrong reasons or out of a wrong motive.24 One might think that killing, lying, 
cheating or murder are all wrong. Such thoughts seem to be about act-types to the extent that it 
entails that all particular acts of killing etc. are wrong. If Eevee kills Jolene and we think that what she 
did was wrong in the sense of 'thing done' delineated in §1 (viz. kill someone) then the wrong thing 
done is something that Ceddy could have also done. Indeed, Ceddy could have even killed the very 
same person (Jolene), though it is too late now that Eevee has done so.  
If this is so, then it cannot matter what Eevee or Ceddy's motives are for it cannot be the 
case that 'kill someone' is a wrong thing done when Eevee does it but not when Ceddy does it, at 
least not systematically so according to any of the normative theories on offer.25 By contrast, Eevee's 
killing of Jolene on Monday morning may be a vicious act motivated by jealousy, whereas Ceddy's 
possible killing of her on Monday evening (say after Simon's botched attempt) would have been an 
act of mercy.   
Similarly, for right actions: Eevee and Ceddy may both give the same amount of money 
and/or the percentage of their income Trust (two different things which may coincide to the British 
Hen Welfare Trust. But suppose that Eevee's doing so just is her trying to impress Simon, whereas 
Ceddy does so in order to help rescue battery hens. In such a case. Eevee and Ceddy each do two 
things, only one of which is the same (give money to the British Hen Welfare Trust). Eevee's doing 
this one thing just is her showing off and, similarly, Ceddy's doing it is identical to his trying to help 
rescue battery hens. Whilst the thing done may or may not be the right thing to do, it would seem 
that Ceddy is acting rightly (or at least well)26 whereas Eevee is not. 
 There seems, then, to be a huge difference between claims concerning a person's doing 
something, and claims about the rightness or wrongness of what they did. Once we become attuned 
to this, certain disputes within normative theory begin to dissolve. Recall the dispute over whether or 
not intention matters to right action. If two or more people can do the same thing with different 
                                                          
21 H.A. Prichard, 'Duty and Ignorance of Fact', 95, my emphasis. Prichard's view of what sorts of things we are 
obliged to do would later change radically upon his embracing the conclusion that to act is to perform a mental 
activity of some kind (viz. to will something); see 'Acting, Willing, Desiring' (1945) in his Moral Writings, 272–81. 
22 In §5 I argue that Ross makes this point in a strikingly paradoxical manner precisely because he lacks the 
doing/thing done distinction. 
23 Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 46, my emphasis. 
24 Both are, of course, to be distinguished from doing something in the wrong way or manner, such as when 
one goes about doing something without the appropriate skill or know-how. 
25 Moral particularism might be an exception here, at least if the particularist is willing to distinguish between 
type and token things done (see §4). 
26 I return to the evaluative/deontic distinction in §5. 
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intentions, it is unclear how intention could possibly matter to the rightness or wrongness of the 
thing that they both do.27 Conversely, it is highly implausible that intention doesn’t matter to the 
moral evaluation of each individual's doing of this thing. It is hard not to conclude from this that the 
notion of right action most amenable to virtue ethics is different from that which is of interest to 
consequentialists. 
While I have chiefly been focusing on motive and intention but the moral appraisal of our 
doings will also depend upon biographical information relating to upbringing, ability, education, 
circumstance and more. Such facts may individually or collectively reveal that a person was acting 
rightly or at least justifiably28 when they did the wrong thing, and wrongly or unjustifiably when they 
did the right thing.  
None of this is to say that there is no connection between descriptions of our doings and the 
things that we do. On the contrary, one can act with the best of intentions and still be acting wrongly 
even if the action is not intentional under the negative description. An act intending to pay tribute to 
another culture, for example, may nonetheless be an instance of cultural appropriation. For 
everything one does unintentionally, there will be a relevant description of their doing it. But there 
are no hard and fast rules by which we can decide which doings remain praiseworthy, permissible, or 
at least excusable, and which are not.  
Often, it can take years or centuries before we are even in a position to understand what had 
been done. In such cases, we must be lenient on the doing without becoming relativists about the 
thing done. Consider the well-trodden debates on whether or not it would be anachronistic to judge 
19th century racism and slavery from a 21st century standpoint. The answer, I contend, is that while 
things done centuries ago were as wrong then as they would be if they were done now, past doings 
may be more forgivable, and at times even justified (precise judgements of past doings would need 
to be formed on a case by case basis).29  
 
 
3. Inner and Outer Lives 
 
 
I have been arguing that there is an important but neglected difference between what it is for a thing 
one does to be right or wrong and for one's doing it to be right or wrong. This lends itself to the 
response, alluded to in my Prologue, that those interested in the doing, motive, intention, etc. 
subscribe to virtue theory, thereby embracing just one normative position among many, and that 
other views – in competition with it – simply deny the importance of such things to right action, or 
perhaps to morality altogether.30 Such points are sometimes put forward as criticisms of virtue ethics 
being agent-centred (as opposed to action-centred) and thereby either failing to provide a theory of 
right action or offering one whose focus is misplaced. Thus, even someone as sympathetic to the 
concerns of virtue ethics as Martha Nussbaum, criticises Iris Murdoch, for being too obsessed with 
the agent's psychology to care about action: 
 
 
                                                          
27 The case of speech-acts in which two people utter the same words but with different meanings highlights a 
wider truth concerning the significance of all the things we do. 
28 See §5. 
29 Hence Luke 22:33–4, which could be alluding to multiple actions from killing the son of God to giving birth to 
the Christian religion: 'And when they came to the place that is called The Skull, there they crucified him, and 
the criminals, one on his right and one on his left. And Jesus said, “Father, forgive them, for they know not 
what they do.”' 
30 The latter view is implicitly embraced in Derek Parfit's On What Matters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
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Murdoch is so preoccupied with the goings-on of the inner world that she seems almost to have forgotten 
about the difference that action can make […] commitment to action can make the difference to people who 
are suffering, no matter whether the agents' intentions are pure.31 
 
 
Nussbaum is here completely separating action from intention, thereby implicitly running with a 
'thing done' notion of action. This move is akin to thinking that since Eevee gave 20% of her salary to 
the British hen Welfare Trust, we should not be morally distracted by the fact that she only did it to 
show off in front of Simon. What matters, on this outlook, is what she did. In the case at hand, the 
thing that Eevee did was right since, unlike her inner motives, it made a good difference in the world. 
Nussbaum's worry is that concerns with another's inner world are overly precious and, in the case of 
one's own actions, narcissistic. Virtue ethicists such as Christine Swanton have responded to such 
criticisms by reminding us that two people may do the very same thing, and yet one's doing might be 
virtuous and the other's an uncaring, racist, or otherwise vicious act of 'mimicry': 
 
 
Rightness, it may be claimed, has nothing to do with an agent's motives or reasons, but has exactly to do with 
success in the external realm […] on my view, an act which mimics the action of a virtuous agent may be wrong, 
because in the hands of the actor it is unvirtuous […] uncaring or racist.32 
 
 
This response is on the right track, but unless we can enrich it with a suitable version of the 
doing/thing done distinction it shall remain as question-begging as Nussbaum's original objection. 
The correct thing to say, I believe, is that while what the vicious agent is doing can be no more (or 
less) uncaring than what the virtuous agent does, her doing it may well be. Indeed, things done are, 
in this technical sense the wrong sorts of thing to be caring or uncaring, rash or prudent, and so on 
for only an individual person's doings may be described adverbially.  
There is, of course, an ordinary sense of 'what she did' in which we might say that she did a 
kind or unkind thing, but all this amounts to is that her doing of x was unkind, or that she was unkind 
to do it.33 If we ignore the conceptual space for this distinction and simply talk of things done as if 
they themselves are re-describable as virtuous or vicious, we will have saved the truth of virtue ethics 
at the cost of masking the truth of consequence-based views and deontologies (such as some forms 
of divine-command theory) which appeal to the instrinsic goodness of act-types (as opposed to 
motives). The truth of these views is that the rightness of what is done does not (indeed cannot) 
depend on the psychology of the agent. 
 
 
4. Ontologies of Action 
 
 
At this juncture it might help to delve a little into some of the ontological questions I remained 
neutral upon earlier. Is there any sense in which an event can itself be deemed to be morally right or 
wrong? And what, if anything, would it be for a universal to be right?  
One answer to the first question appeals to Donald Davidson's notion that an action is an 
event that is intentional under some description. I shall not critique this here, save to say that while it 
is innocuous to say that the event of someone's doing one thing (e.g. playing music) intentionally 
may be identical to the event of their doing something else (waking up the neighbours) 
                                                          
31 Martha C. Nussbaum, Philosophical Interventions: 1986–2011 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 269. 
32 Christine Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 245. 
33 Macmurray and Hornsby are right to claim that in everyday language we typically talk of things done, but as 
noted in §1 this way of speaking is very loose. 
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unintentionally, this does not reduce to the far more baffling claim that is is the event itself that is 
intentional under some description(s). 
 In one of very few existing papers attempting to relate action theory to normative ethics 
Matthew Hanser resists Davidsonian simplicity as follows: 
 
 
We may think of the 'things people do,' […] as act – or behavior – types. A particular person's throwing of a 
particular baseball on a particular occasion, by contrast, is not an act – or behavior – type. It is a token action, 
an unrepeatable, particular instantiation of the act-type throwing a baseball […] 'What he did was wrong' 
concerns some unspecified act-type instantiated by the agent, whereas 'He acted wrongly in doing what he did' 
concerns the agent's particular instantiation of that act-type.34 
 
 
Hanser's metaphysics seem implausible to me for a number of related reasons: the things we do are 
not types of action but actions that fall under types. The relation between doings and things done is 
thus not one between types and tokens. A doing is not an instance of a thing done anymore than a 
believing is an instance of a thing believed, and there are type and token doings (just as there are 
type and token events and processes35) just as there are type and token things done. If A kills B this 
may or may not fall under the type 'killing an adolescent' or 'killing an innocent human'. 
 A different way of resisting Hanser's approach is to deny that there is any morally relevant 
distinction to be made between doings and things done. An explicit defence of it has been made by 
Jonathan Dancy, who writes: 
 
 
There should be less of action in our moral metaphysics, not more….'he did the right thing for the wrong 
reason' […] means something like 'he acted rightly, but for the wrong reasons'[…]'he V-ed, and in the situation 
he was right to V, but the reasons why he V-ed were not the reasons why he was right to V' [..] rightness is not 
a way of acting […] there is no room for the combination of blameless agent and wrong action that might force 
us towards some notion of an action as a distinct bearer of evaluative properties.36  
 
 
On Dancy's account, we so conduct all the theoretical work we need to do with one notion of action, 
coupled with a narrative about the agent's reasons. While there is much to agree with in the above 
passage, it won't do to say that the person who does the right thing for the wrong reason(s) is acting 
rightly. After all, she isn't acting virtuously, for it is merely by chance that she is doing the right thing 
at all. This point is brought out well in the following passage by Rosalind Hursthouse: 
 
 
[A]ct honestly, charitably, generously; do not act dishonestly, etc. […] the adverbs connote not only doing what 
the virtuous agent would do, but also doing it 'in the way' she would do it, which includes 'for the same sort(s) 
of reason(s)' […] What is misleading about this phrase is that it obscures the fact that, in one way, the agent is 
not 'doing the right thing'. What she is doing is, say, trying to impress the onlookers, or hurting someone's 
feelings, or avoiding punishment.37 
 
                                                          
34 Matthew Hanser, 'Actions, Acting, and Acting Well', in (ed.) Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in 
Metaethics, Vol 3 (2008), 272–3. Cf. Romane Clark, ‘Deeds, Doings and What is Done’, Noûs, Vol. 23, No. 2 
(1989), 199–210. 
35 It should already be clear by now that I don't maintain that doings are processes and/or events. 
36 Jonathan Dancy, 'Action in Moral Metaphysics' in (ed.) C. Sandis, New Essays on Action Explanation (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 396ff. Cf. his 'Action, Content and Inference' in (eds.) H-J. Glock & J. Hyman, 
Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 278–98. 
37 Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 29 & 125. 
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Hursthouse makes her point without appealing to any form of the doing/thing done distinction and, 
pari passu, concludes that what the vicious agent is doing is wrong. And indeed, one of the things 
that she has done is wrong (namely showing off), but she has also done something quite right 
(donating to the the British Hen Welfare Trust), albeit for the wrong reason, as Dancy puts it. Yet the 
idea that the agent has done anything right has all but disappeared from Hursthouse's narrative. 
Assuming that two people can do the same thing for different reasons, it can be true that the person 
acting wrongly is still doing the right thing. When two or more people do the same thing for different 
reasons, there will be huge discrepancies in our evaluation of their doings. We need look no further 
than the 69,456,897 people voted for Obama in 2008, and the plurality of reasons in the offing. 
 
 
5. Moral Appraisal 
 
 
Consider the following claim by Thomas Nagel, which forms a crucial assumption behind his 
understanding of moral luck: 
 
 
We judge people for what they actually do or fail to do […] a person can be morally responsible only for what 
he does.38 
 
 
Implicit in this remark is the identification of all action with the things we do, as made explicit by 
Swann in Proust's In Search of Lost Time, a novel fixated with relation of fleeting particulars to  
repeatable universals: 
 
 
"It's not for nothing," he now assured himself, "that whenever people pass judgements on their fellows, it's 
always for their actions. It's only what we do that counts, and not at all what we say or think…"39 
 
 
Here we encounter, once more, the idea that we judge others simply by being provided with a list of 
the things they did. We might call this the obituary view of moral appraisal. It is no wonder that 
actions so conceived – without mention of the doings which reveal our reasons, motives, and 
intentions – are so readily susceptible to moral luck. 40   But it would be pretty extreme to deny that 
we are not to judge them for this. Perhaps this is not Nagel's view and he thinks, with Anscombe, 
that action descriptions reveal intention. If so, he is conflating the things we do with our doings of 
them.41 
 Moving further back into the history of deontology, we find the following pronouncement in 
Kant's second critique: 
 
 
                                                          
38 Thomas Nagel, 'Moral Luck', in his Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 146, my 
emphasis. Nagel explicitly conflates things done with events in The View From Nowhere (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986, p.114) an observation first made in Hornsby, Simple Mindedness, 143-48. 
39 Marcel Proust, Swann's Way [1913], trns. C.K.S. Moncrieff & T. Kilmartin, rev. d.J. Enright (London: Chatto & 
Windus 1992), 430, my emphasis. The set of things we do, of course, includes speaking.  
40 It is noteworthy that simple descriptions of things done (e.g. 'lying') may reveal the agent's intention but not 
their motive. 
41 For independent reasons for thinking that Nagel is guilty of such conflations see Hornsby, Simple Mindedness 
and Sandis, The Things We Do. 
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Most lawful actions would be done from fear, only a few from hope, and none at all from duty; and the moral 
worth of actions – on which alone, after all, the worth of the person and even that of the world hinges in the 
eyes of the highest wisdom – would not exist at all.42 
 
 
It is no surprise that all law, be it divine, social, or moral should primarily focus on things done rather 
than doings, for it is the fact that one did something that we can provide evidence for in any kind of 
court.43 So it is that in Romans 2:6 of the the New International Version of the Bible, we are told in 
God 'will repay each person according to what they have done' (see also Mathew 16:27 and 
Corinthians 11:15).44 Kant's insight is that one could do the right thing and yet one's action might still 
lack moral worth, if done from the wrong motive. Suppose we knew for certain that heaven and hell 
existed: many of us might then make sure that we did all the right (morally lawful) things, but we 
would do them from an unethical motive (fear or hope, but never duty).45 This appreciation of the 
fact that the moral worth of actions is completely separable from the rightness or wrongness of the 
things they do, a view shared by his most famous opponent in moral philosophy, John Stuart Mill: 
 
 
He who saves a creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of 
being paid for his trouble […] A right action does not necessarily indicate a virtuous character and […] actions 
which are blameable often proceed from qualities entitled to praise.46 
 
 
Kant and Mill form a sharp contrast to the view from Nagel, according to which we are to appraise 
people for what they do, and nothing else.47 The clash cannot be resolved in either party's favour, for 
it stems from muddled conceptions of action. In the above passages, Kant and Mill separate the 
worthiness of actions from their rightness and wrongness, whereas Nagel wishes to align the two.48 A 
third solution, proposed by Robert Audi, is that we 'should distinguish the moral worth of an act from 
its creditworthiness'.49 But this just digs deeper into the same conceptual pit. The way out of it is not 
                                                          
42 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason [1788]; trns & ed. M.J. Gregor & A. Reath (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5: 147. Yet it is events that have consequences (even if we might ordinarily 
speak of 'the things we do' having consequences).  
43 A complication here is that we can of course find evidence for the occurrence of events, which J.L. Austin 
famously brings close to facts in ‘Unfair to Facts’ (1954), reprinted in his Philosophical Papers (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1961), 154–74. Those who follow Austin in this critique of P.F. Strawson may prove more 
inclined to identify things done, and not doings, with events of some kind (see note 13). It should by now be 
clear that I think that while this temptation should be resisted, we would do equally well to avoid conflating 
one's doing x with the event of one's doing x (it only being sensible to apply moral properties to the former).  
44 Other translations have variants of judge, reward, or render to everyone according to their 'deeds' (King 
James) or 'works' (English Standard Version), the latter being the more accurate translation of the Greek 'ἔργα' 
and the Hebrew ' ה ֶׂשֲעַמ' found in many of the Old Testament Parallels (Job 34:11, Psalm 62:12, Proverbs 24:1, 
Ecclesiastes 3:17, Jeremiah 17:10, and Ezekiel 18:20 & 36:19; cf. Exodus 32:34).  
45 For a deflationist interpretation of what Kant means by the motive of duty see Onora O'Neill, 'Kantian Ethics' 
in (ed.) P. Singer, A Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 183. 
46 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, 1863 (London: Parker, Son & Bourn), 18–20. This is in tension with those aspects of 
Mill's philosophy that seem to require actions to be events with causes and effects. 
47 Hegel famously talks of the history's progress from the ancient ethical concern with pure objective deed (Tat) 
to the modern interest in the subjective element of action (Handlung). For how this relates to my concerns in 
this paper see my ‘The Man Who Mistook his Handlung for a Tat’, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, 
No. 62 (2010), 35–60. 
48 Cf. T.M. Scanlon Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (New Jersey: Harvard University Press, 
2008), esp. 122–7 & 151–9. 
49 Robert Audi, The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 133. 
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to pile on further distinctions but to understand that between the things we do and our acts of doing 
them.50  
A neat way of proceeding is to attempt to map the distinction onto that between evaluative 
and deontic concepts and norms, the former being concerned with praise or blame (good and bad), 
the latter with duty and obligation (right and wrong).51 So conceived, the doing would be the bearer 
of moral worth and the things done that of rightness and wrongness.52 While not an altogether 
unhelpful move, it leaves one wondering why our doings cannot be morally right or wrong and, 
conversely, whether there might be things done that are in themselves good or bad (e.g. acts of 
kindness of charity).53 
No discussion of the distinction between the right and good would be complete without 
mention of the pluralistic deontology of Ross, who brings out the extremely paradoxical nature of 
maintaining, alongside Kant, that the right action may be morally worthless: 
 
 
[N]othing that ought to be done is ever morally good […] the only acts that are morally good are those that 
proceed from a good motive...If, then, we can show that action from a good motive is never morally obligatory, 
we shall have established that what is morally good is never right...That action from a good motive is never 
obligatory follows from the Kantian principle […] that 'I ought' implies 'I can'. It is not the case that I can by 
choice produce a certain motive […] if we contemplate a right act alone, it is seen to have no intrinsic value […] 
however carelessly I pack or dispatch the book, if it comes to hand I have done my duty, and however carefully 
I acted, if the book does not come to hand I have not done my duty. Of course I should deserve more praise in 
the second case than in the first […] we must not mix up the question of right and wrong with that of the 
morally good and the morally bad […] if the carelessly dispatched book comes to hand, it is not my duty to send 
another copy, while if the carefully dispatched book does not come to hand I must send another to replace it.54 
 
 
This is all well and good, but the paradox of the first line occurs precisely because the evaluative and 
deontic properties are being applied to one kind of thing called 'action'. The same holds true of the 
added claim that 'what is morally good is never right'. How could it possibly be true that the right and 
the good can never coincide? Ross holds that motives belong in the world of evaluation and actions 
in that of obligation. But this distinction is ill equipped to do the work required from it. Ross' aims 
would have been better served by one between the doing and the thing done. 
As noted earlier, the doing/thing done distinction is in some respects analogous to many 
others, including that between what one believes and one's believing it. Suppose I believe something 
that's true and which I ought to believe but I do so for very bad reasons. You may wish to criticise my 
believing it without criticising the belief I have (which you and I might, after all, share). Conversely, I 
may be perfectly justified in having a belief that turns out to be false. Hence the initial divide of 
intuitions about whether Edmund Gettier's famous examples were indeed ones of justified true 
belief, for what was justified was the thing believed, not the believing. Clayton Littlejohn's diagnosis 
of the situation offers the following trifecta of ascriptions: 
 
Ascriptions of personal justification tell us something about a believer – whether she is justified in believing. An 
ascription of doxastic justification tells us something about a belief – whether the belief is justifiably held. An 
                                                          
50 I don't claim that this way of carving things up is the only one true to the facts, just that it does a better 
explanatory job than its competitors. 
51 Cf. Kevin Mulligan, ‘From Appropriate Emotions to Values’, The Monist, vol. 81, no. 1 (1988), 161–88, and 
Christine Tappolet, 'Evaluative Vs. Deontic Concepts’, The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (2013). 
52 Peter Geach argues that we should jettison the concept of right action and make do with talk of good and 
bad acts, which was good enough for Aquinas (P.T. Geach, 'Good and Evil', Analysis, Vol.1, 7 1956, 41ff.) His 
illustrations, however, betray a conflation between deeds and doings. 
53 But see note 34 above. 
54 W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), 132ff. 
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ascription of propositional justification tells us something about a proposition – whether the proposition is 
such that there is sufficient justification for someone to believe it.55 
 
 
Gilbert Harman makes a very similar disambiguation in relation to action: 
 
 
I do want to distinguish between using the word 'wrong' to say that a particular situation or action is wrong 
from using the word to say that it is wrong of someone to do something.56 
 
 
This is the idea that what a person did was right but it was wrong of them to do it or, conversely, that 
what they did was wrong but it was right of them to do it. But what is it for something to be right or 
wrong of someone? Nothing that is worryingly relativistic or subjective. It is simply the thought that a 
person may be right or wrong to do something given all the evidence available in some further 
specifiable sense. Helpful as Harman's distinction is, it doesn't get us all the way. The problem, to 
return to the charity example, is not that it was wrong of me to make a donation to the British Hen 
Welfare Trust in the case where my doing so is vicious. The difficulty is not that some people ought 
to give to the British Hen Welfare Trust, but not me, it is that my giving to them was unethical 
despite the fact that it would have been right of me to make a donation.57 This should not be 
confused with those of blameless wrongdoing as understood by either or Derek Parfit, both of whom 
fail to distinguish between doing and thing done, thereby rendering their examples hostage to 
unnecessary paradoxes concerning luck and belief, respectively.58 
Acting rightly does not amount to doing the right thing, nor vice versa. Philosophers that stop 
shy of making this distinction find themselves having to make up for it by concocting new distinctions 
elsewhere. And yet these never seem quite capable of doing the work required. Without losing track 
of the fact that even Oedipus' tragic deeds are imputable to him,59 we should not praise or blame 
people solely on the ground of what they did or didn't do.  
In an obituary what one typically finds is a list of achievements and failures. The sorts of 
things listed here are things done e.g. she founded a charity, fought in the second world war, 
directed two Oscar-winning films, or wrote an influential book. Indeed, the very chronology of 
peoples' life is typically offered as a sort of list of things done: she went to school A. studied subject x 
at university B, took a job as y at firm C, and so on. What is much rarer is an attempt to reveal the 
person's acts of doing these things, as a serious biography might. Without this crucial feature any 
attempt at praise and blame will be half-blind and paradoxical. This holds true across moral theory as 
a whole. Normative ethics but leave space for both our deeds and doings. 
 
                                                          
55Clayton Littlejohn, Justification and the Truth Connection (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5. 
Cf. White, 'What We Believe', & Catherine Lowy, 'Gettier's Notion of Justification', Mind 87 (1978), 105–8. A 
further question (an analogue of which appears in my discussion of Harman further below) is whether the 
person's being justified to have the belief that p is identical to her believing that p being justified. 
56 Gilbert Harman, Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 6–7. 
57 Perhaps it neither was nor wasn't right of me to do so. Either way, the scenario should not be confused with 
those of blameless wrongdoing as understood by Bernard Williams in Shame and Necessity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press,1993), 68–70 or by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984),34. Neither Williams nor Parfit distinguish between doing and thing done, thereby rendering their 
examples hostage to unnecessary paradoxes concerning luck and belief, respectively. 
58 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1993), 68–70 & Derek Parfit, 
Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984),34. 
59 See my ‘Motivated by the Gods', in (eds.) A. Buckareff, C. Moya, & S.Rosell, Agency and Responsibility 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), §3. 
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Epilogue 
 
 
John Macmurray, whose distinction between doing and deed we began with, would some decades 
later complain that art 'is treated not as a form of reflective activity, but as a set of ‘works’ to be 
apprehended and appreciated'.60 Around the same time, art critic Harold Rosenberg baptised a non-
cohesive group of artists, the most famous of which was Jackson Pollock, as 'action painters'. 
Rosenberg's central idea – later taken up by David Davies61 – was that the real work of art is not the 
the painting or building (noun) but the act of painting or building (verb). We might equally, if not 
entirely analogously, distinguish between the dancing and the dance, the composing of a song, and 
the song composed, the photographing and the photograph taken and subsequently developed. 
Thus, Bob Dylan's 'Girl from the North Country' may be a superior song to 'Scarborough Fair', even if 
the composition of the former involved stealing both melody and line from the latter.  
Rosenberg's theory is coupled with the additional thought that the painting on the canvas 
represents the act of painting it, not the way in which one might draw a self-portrait of the artist at 
work but by being a residue of the act of painting which bore the gesture traces of the brush strokes 
that produced it: 
 
 
A canvas is […] an arena in which to act […] A painting is an action […] that becomes its own 
representation […] An act can be prolonged from a piece of paper to a canvas.62 
 
 
This echoes Ricœur's metaphor of acting as the thing done as a kind of trace (of the event of acting) 
left in the world; a mark in history or memory. This mark or imprint is a reminder or at best a kind of 
souvenir of the artistic event of painting (verb). Hence the famous videos of Pollock painting his 
massive canvasses; this was not intended to just be a portrayal of the artist at work but a document 
of the art itself unfolding, with or without performance. What was hung on the wall being but the 
marks which have been left behind, the ashes of an event long-gone.63 
Rosenberg undoubtedly took his own metaphor too seriously, thus prompting Mary 
McCarthy to quip 'you can’t hang an event on the wall, only a picture'.64 But while it may be 
nonsense to say that a painting is an action or that it represents itself, the movement teaches us that 
art presents us with two objects of aesthetic evaluation: the creating and the thing created. As with 
right action ,I have no interest in offering any theory of art here (let alone one which highlights one 
of these things over the other). I merely wish to point out that it is the act of creating which 
expresses the author's motives or intentions. After all, the thing created could have been made by a 
                                                          
60 John Macmurray, Persons in Relation (London: Faber & Faber, 1961), 11. 
61 David Davies, Art as Performance (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). For insightful critical overviews of attempts to 
capture something similar by distinguishing the phenomenology of making art from that of spectating see 
Steven Crowell, 'Phenomenology and aesthetics; or why art matters' in (ed.) J. Parry, Art and Phenomenology 
(London: Routledge, 2011), 31–53 and Kate Kirkpatrick, 'Beneath the Surface: Whose Phenomenology? Which 
Art?', in (eds.) L. Nelstrop & H. Appleton Mysticism and Art (London: Routledge, 2017). 
62 Harold Rosenberg, ‘The American Action Painters’ in his The Tradition of the New (New York, NY: Da Capo 
Press, 1960), 26–8. In his Preface to the book Rosenberg nonetheless talks of art in terms of 'things made' 
which he contrasts with 'deeds done'. 
63 Marks which sell for grotesque amounts of money, but this arguably only serves to illustrate our fetishistic 
attachment to unique souvenirs such as the original reels of music or film. See Constantine Sandis 'An Honest 
Display of Fakery', in (eds.) Harrison, V., Kemp, G. & Bergqvist, A., Philosophy and Museums: Ethics, Aesthetics, 
and Ontology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 1–9. 
64 As quoted in Rosenberg's Preface referring to 'her generous review of this book'. 
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different person with a different aim.65  
We are now in a position to appreciate Nietzsche's intriguing conception of life as art:  
 
Art is the real task of life, art as life’s metaphysical activity.66 
 
Nietzsche does not have the life of an artist in mind here. Rather, the task of any life is the creating of 
the life lived. The art in question, here, is not the life ones creates for oneself, but the life-long 
activity of creating it: the living of the life and not the life lived. In his magisterial work Nietzsche: Life 
as Literature, Alexander Nehamas parses Nietzsche's motto in terms of things done instead of doings: 
 
Everything we have done actually constitutes who each one of us is.67 
 
This is no misinterpretation of Nietzsche but a reflection of the fact that our ordinary term 'thing 
done' is itself ambiguous in ways that can be philosophically troubling. A case in point is Sartre's 
existentialist retelling of Nietzsche's tale: 
 
Man is nothing other than his own projects. He exists only to the extent that he realizes himself, therefore he is 
nothing more than the sum of his actions, nothing more than his life.68 
 
 
If this view is to capture the roundedness of human life, the sum of our actions had better include 
the totality of both our deeds and doings. It is in this spirit that Ronald Dworkin writes: 
 
 
The final value of our lives is adverbial, not adjectival. It's the value of the performance, not anything that is left 
when the performance is subtracted.69 
 
 
Dworkin models his distinction between having a good life and living well to that between art 
products and artistic acts of creation. The argument runs parallel to that of Rosenberg and Davies 
who claim that artistic value is adverbial though, like myself, Dworkin is not committed to any views 
about what art is. For my own part, I have merely sought to show that there is value to be found in 
both the living and the life lived, the doing and the thing done, the creating and the thing created.70  
In sum, we should be dualists about the objects of both moral and aesthetic evaluation.71 
                                                          
65 Victor Dura-Vila reminded me that aesthetics places no value in the artistic analogue of a 'pure will'. To this 
extent, all art theory is on Mill's side. There remains, nonetheless, the Collingwoodian understanding of art as 
the imaginative creation, Principles of Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), 128–34. Cf. Benedetto Croce, 
Aesthetic: As science of expression and general linguistic, trns. D. Ainslee (London: Macmillan). 
66 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power [1886], trns. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), §853, 
IV. 
67 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 188. See 
also Zachary Simpson, Life as Art: Aesthetics and the Creation of the Self (London: Roman & littlefield, 2012). 
68 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism is a Humanism, trns. C. Macomber (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2007 [1945]),37. 
69 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Boston, NJ: Harvard University Press, 2011), 197. Note the allusion to 
Wittgenstein's famous rhetorical question, 'what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the 
fact that I raise my arm?', Philosophical Investigations, trns. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), §621. 
70 The theological implications are nicely brought out in Kirkpatrick, 'Beneath the Surface'. 
71 As with soup and things done, we can talk of things produced as either repeatables or particulars. P.F. 
Strawson writes: 'We should be able to speak of the same painting being seen by different people in different 
places at one time, in just the same way in which we now speak of the same sonata being heard by different 
people at different times in one place'. Strawson, ‘Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art’, The Oxford Review, 
                                                                                                                                        
15 
 
There is much that normative ethics can learn from the the once fashionable 'death of the 
author' view of art. Its insight is not that the author has no say tout court but only that, pace 
intentionalism about art products, our aesthetic evaluation of their creation must, unlike that of their 
creative acts, ultimately carry on without them.72 As with creations, our deeds are but the ashes of 
our acts in time. To evaluate our lives solely by them would be a grave mistake.73 
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no. 3 (1966], reprinted in his Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2008), 
202. I concur, but leave it for another day to quibble over whether Pierre Menard's Don Quixote could have 
ever been an identical work to that of Cervantes. 
72 This does not preclude the possibility of better understanding the things we do and create by situating them 
within the normative contexts of their production. For the convoluted question of what, if anything, it is to 
understand an act or artwork, see my 'If an Artwork Could Speak’, in (ed.) G. Hagberg, Wittgenstein on 
Aesthetic Understanding (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 
73 I have subjected audiences in Cardiff, Grenoble, London, Helsinki, Hertfordshire, Montréal, Norwich, Oxford, 
Tartu, Turku, Wolverhampton, and Valencia to earlier versions of this material and am grateful to all of them 
for their comments and questions. I'd like to also thank Joseph Almog, Louise R. Chapman, Rémi Clot-Goudard, 
Meena Dhanda, Victor Dura-Vila, James Garvey, Naomi Goulder, Kate Kirkpatrick, Andreas Lind, Elijah Millgram, 
Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Henry Mulhall, Luke Mulhall, Sarah Stroud, Christine Tappolet, and Susanne Uusitalo 
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